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MIRANDA, DICKERSON, AND THE
PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF FIFTH
AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONALISM
Stephen J. Schulhofer*
Dickerson v. United States1 preserves the status quo regime for ju
dicial oversight of police interrogation. That result could be seen, iri
the present climate, as a victory for due process values, but there re
main many reasons for concern that existing safeguards are flawed that they are either too restrictive or not restrictive enough. Such con
cerns are partly empirical, of course. They depend on factual assess
ments of how much the Miranda rules do restrict the police. But such
concerns also reflect a crucial, though often unstated, normative
premise; they presuppose a certain view of how much the police
should be restricted.
To evaluate the Miranda safeguards and determine whether they
should be replaced by some other regime, it is essential to focus first
on that normative premise. And for present purposes I will restrict
myself to its constitutional dimension. I will focus on a surprisingly ne
glected question - that of determining which restrictions on police
interrogation are mandated by ordinary Fifth Amendment principles.
My thesis is that the Court, even as it reaffirmed Miranda, perpetuated
an extraordinarily confusing and illogical notion of what the Fifth
Amendment means. Both the Court's majority in Dickerson and its
dissenters share a conception of the Fifth Amendment that can be
right only if the constitutional principles governing police interroga
tion differ from those that determine Fifth Amendment compulsion in
every other setting. In other words, the Court (and all its Justices) ap
parently accept a kind of Fifth Amendment exceptionalism, under
which the standards applicable to police interrogation are kept distinct
from the standards applicable to all other official questioning of wit
nesses and suspected offenders.
* Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Chicago Law School.
- Ed. I want to express special appreciation to Yale Kamisar. Even before we met, he had
opened my eyes to the realities of police interrogation, and for many years he has been for
me a generous and inspiring teacher. For comments on the manuscript, I owe thanks as well
to participants at the conference and at the Fordham Law School Faculty Workshop, and to
Abner Greene, Larry Kramer, and Carol Steiker.

1. 120 S. Ct. 2326

(2000).
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Part I of this Article defends that thesis. Part II then explores con
ceivable alternatives to Miranda, and Part III suggests several ways to
supplement the Miranda regime in order to bring it more closely into
conformity with the Fifth Amendment principles that are accepted,
largely without controversy, in every interrogation setting outside the
police station. But first one preliminary: Are there any alternatives
that the Court would tolerate as replacements for Miranda?
Opponents of Miranda often complain that the Court eliminated
promising alternatives, "blocked" experimentation, and locked us into
a straitjacket of rigid rules.2 That was never a plausible reading of
Miranda, and the Dickerson opinion re-emphasizes that the Court is
perfectly willing to uphold alternatives to the Miranda system (that is,
the system of police-delivered warnings, an express waiver prior to
questioning, and respect for a suspect's request to cut off questioning
at any time). The only limitation stated in Dickerson is one that ap
pears almost verbatim in Miranda itself: any alternative must include
"procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain
silent and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right
will be honored. "3
That is a reasonable and fairly minimal limitation. It's easy to
imagine procedures that would meet it. Police could, for example, be
excused from the warnings part of Miranda whenever warnings were
given by a magistrate or by duty counsel at the stationhouse. There are
many other ways to protect Fifth Amendment rights as effectively or
more effectively than Miranda does, and if an alternative does that,
there is no reason to worry that the Supreme Court would overturn it.
That brings us to choosing among alternatives, which means figur
ing out what problems a substitute for Miranda should seek to solve.
I am going to set aside Professor Cassell's complaint that Miranda
puts tens of thousands of violent criminals on the streets every year by
lowering clearance and conviction rates. He and I have debated that
claim many times, and it's hard to imagine that there could be any
thing more to say about it.4

2. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's
U. L. REV. 387, 498 (1996).

Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment,

90 NW.

3. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335. The limitation, as originally stated in Miranda, is virtu
ally identical: Any alternative must be "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of
their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it." Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
4. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 2; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect:
Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996)
[hereinafter Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect]; Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs:
The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996) [hereinafter
Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 Nw.
U. L. REV. 278 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Negligible Effect on Law Enforcement:
Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 327 (1997); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
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I think it's fair to say that Professor Cassell's position has not won
overwhelming agreement from criminal justice scholars. And in
Dickerson, after reams of paper had been devoted to raising the issue,
no member of the Supreme Court nibbled at it. There's no hint, even
from Chief Justice Rehnquist, that any Justice sees lost confessions as
a serious problem,5 and there's no hint that the Court will give that
concern any weight in future decisions.
That in itself does not prove that Professor Cassell is wrong what does, in my opinion, is the data. In any case, for practical pur
poses the lost-convictions issue is now moot. Professor Cassell is free
to continue flogging that very dead horse if he wants to, but there's no
reason why anyone else should devote energy to trying to solve what
looks like a nonexistent problem. Miranda probably prevents some
confessions, but it also helps the police obtain others. The great weight
of the evidence suggests that the Miranda system, as currently admin
istered, causes no net reduction in confession rates, clearance rates, or
conviction rates.6
The problems with Miranda lie almost entirely in the other direc
tion - the Miranda system is too weak. That claim will sound odd to
anyone used to hearing that Miranda mandates overinclusive prophy
lactic rules and that it "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself."7 So it is essential that I begin with first principles
and consider why and to what extent the Constitution restrains police
interrogation in the first place. Then I will specifically address where
Miranda falls short and propose several remedies.
I.

POLICE INTERROGATION AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Much as I welcomed the Dickerson result and nearly all of the
opinion's language, I was disappointed that the Court perpetuated
confusion about the constitutional basis for restrictions on police in
terrogation. The Fifth Amendment, as everyone knows, says that no
person shall be "compelled" to be a witness against himself in a crimi
nal case. Two misperceptions about "compulsion" are commonly
Miranda is Unjustified - and Harmful, 20
(hereinafter Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda].

Bashing

HARV.

J.L. PUB. POL'Y 347 (1997)

5. The Chief Justice does write, in his opinion for the court, that a "disadvantage of the
is that "a guilty person [may] go free as a result." 120 S. Ct. at 2336. But he
mentions nothing to suggest that he considers this a frequent or serious problem, and imme
diately after noting this disadvantage, he enumerates offsetting ways in which Miranda
sometimes eases the task of insuring that a confession will be ruled admissible.

Miranda rule"

6. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4; see also John J.
Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN L. REV. 1147 (1998).

Donohue

III,

Did

Miranda

.

7. The claim that Miranda "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself" ap
pears repeatedly in Rehnquist Court comments on the conceptual basis of Miranda. E.g.,
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 306 (1985).
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voiced. They are echoed in such Supreme Court opinions as Elstad,
Tucker and Quarles,8 and to a lesser extent carried forward in
Dickerson itself: (1) that a statement isn't really compelled unless it is
judged "involuntary" within the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment
due process, and (2) that judgments about real compulsion must con
sider the totality of the circumstances in the particular case.
Conservative unease about Miranda and the perception of its du
bious legitimacy; not to mention temper tantrums like the one on dis
play in Justice Scalia's Dickerson dissent, rest directly on these two
premises - that compulsion means involuntariness and that judg
ments about compulsion must consider the totality of the circum
stances. Yet both of these premises are dead wrong.
It may seem presumptuous for me to pronounce a legal assertion
dead wrong when it appears over and over in opinions of the U.S.
Supreme Court. But, nonetheless, as the next section explains, those
two premises are indisputably wrong. Or - to put the point more po
litely - those two premises can be right only if the constitutional prin
ciples governing police interrogation differ from those that determine
Fifth Amendment compulsion in every other setting. In other words,
those two premises imply a kind of Fifth Amendment exceptionalism,
under which the standards applicable to police interrogation, even un
der Miranda, remain distinct from the standards applicable to all other
official questioning of witnesses and suspected offenders.
A.

The Concept of Fifth Amendment Compulsion

Consider the first premise - that compulsion means the kind of
involuntariness barred by Fourteenth Amendment due process. This
premise simply cannot be true. Compulsion cannot mean involuntari
ness. Outside the context of police interrogation at least, it is impossi
ble to equate compulsion with involuntariness because courts that
consider themselves barred from ever admitting an involuntary state
ment nonetheless routinely admit and use statements that are unambi
guously compelled.
A statement that is truly involuntary, one that has been coerced by
"breaking the suspect's will," is never admissible for any purpose.9 But
witnesses are routinely required to give statements under subpoena.
Even when a person is a criminal suspect, he can, after a grant of im
munity, be forced to give statements under subpoena.10 Such state
ments are clearly and literally compelled. Yet, far from being inadmis
sible, as involuntary statements are, these compelled statements are
8. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985); New York
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974).
9. Mincey

v.

10. Kastigar

v.

Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Michigan

Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978).
v.

United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972).

v.
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unquestionably admissible; they are the bread and butter of virtually
all judicial proceedings. Consider the Supreme Court's comment, the
essential underpinning for its decision in United States v. Nixon, 11 that
"it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be
available . . . . "12 Indeed, the Sixth Amendment grants the accused a
constitutional right to compulsory process to call· witnesses in his fa
vor; the Constitution mandates the admissibility of these compelled
(but not involuntary) statements.U
Waiver doctrine underscores the same point. When it comes to
Fourteenth Amendment safeguards against involuntariness, against
being subjected to coercion that breaks the will, talk of "waiver" is in
apt. One can never waive the right not to have one's will overborne by
intolerable pressure, by conduct that "shocks the conscience."14 But
Fifth Amendment rights can be waived; once a witness testifies under
oath, the court can compel her to answer questions under cross
examination. Not by lashes or electric shock of course - that would
overbear her will in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. But after
a valid waiver, she can be subpoenaed, held in contempt, and sent to
jail until she talks, even when her answers may incriminate her. Such
measures obviously involve compulsion and are impermissible against
a suspect who properly claims the Fifth Amendment, but they do not
"overbear the will" in the way that the Fourteenth Amendment cate
gorically forbids.
If the suggested distinction between compelled and involuntary
statements seems fine-spun and verbally artificial, we should try to
imagine whether the law could manage without such a distinction.
Clearly, we need some concept (call it concept A) to define the kind of
pressures and penalties that government should never be allowed to
deploy against a potential witness under any circumstances. With re
spect to pressures and penalties that do not fall within A, we could
conceivably say that government may use those methods to get testi
mony from any potential witness, regardless of whether the witness is
a criminal suspect or a person making a plausible claim of self
incrimination. Under that view, any penalty that could be deployed
against an ordinary witness (a contempt citation, for example) could
also be used against a criminal defendant. That view would require re
peal of the Fifth Amendment.
As long as we have a Fifth Amendment, some of the pressures and
penalties that can be freely deployed against ordinary witnesses will
not be available as devices to obtain self-incriminating testimony from
11. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
12. Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
13. Washington
14. Rochin

v.

v.

Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967).

California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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a criminal suspect. And we will therefore of necessity require some
concept (call it concept Z) to identify those devices - that is, the pres
sures and penalties that can be legitimately deployed against ordinary
witnesses but cannot be used to obtain self-incriminating statements
from criminal defendants or suspects.
There is obviously no verbal similarity and no necessary concep
tual congruence between A and Z. It is only the labels traditionally
used (coercion, involuntariness, and breaking the will for A; compul
sion for Z) that sometimes trick us into assuming that concepts A and
Z are essentially one. In fact they are distinct and only distantly re
lated. And concept Z ("compulsion") clearly and inevitably - by
definition - extends to pressures and penalties that are not prohibited
by concept A ("involuntariness").
Thus it is not just Miranda that "sweeps more broadly" than the
due process rule against involuntary statements. The Fifth Amendment
itself sweeps more broadly than the due process rule against involun
tary statements. Absent a valid waiver, the Fifth Amendment prohib
its use of a compelled statement against the person compelled, even
when the compelled statement is not involuntary within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The premise that Fifth Amendment
compulsion means involuntariness is simply incoherent.15
The second premise of Miranda criticism is that the only way to de
termine whether a statement is really compelled is to assess the rele
vant pressures under the totality of the circumstances. This premise
fares no better than the first. If we set aside Fifth Amendment excep
tionalism (the idea that police interrogation should be severed from
the principles governing witness questioning in every other setting),
then the totality-of-the-circumstances premise is indisputably wrong.
Consider the classic example of impermissible Fifth Amendment
compulsion - the threat of a contempt citation for refusal to testify
under oath. That threat has always been treated as impermissibly
compelling per se, even though many witnesses can and do resist it and
face jail rather than testify. A comment at trial on a criminal defen15. This truncated analysis leaves open at least two important issues. First, to stress, as I
have done here, the inherent distinction between Fourteenth Amendment involuntariness
and Fifth Amendment compulsion does not by itself provide normative justification for the
Fifth Amendment itself, that is for a constitutional regime that permits certain strong pres
sures to be deployed against ordinary witnesses but not against criminal suspects. For discus
sion of that normative issue, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311 (1991).
Second, the analysis does not attempt to fill out the exact content of either "compulsion"
or "involuntariness." It is only a partial defense of this gap to note that the Court itself has
given little precise content to either term, and the distinction between them cannot be meas
ured until the content of each is operationally defined. For one attempt to develop a formal
definition of compulsion, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 435 (1987). For attempts to define involuntariness, see Catherine Hancock, Due
Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195 (1996); Welsh S. White, What is an Involun
tary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001 (1998).
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dant's failure to testify is impermissibly compelling per se, regardless
of the tactical and evidentiary factors that determine how much pres
sure such a comment would present in a particular case.16 The point is
made especially clear in Carter v. Kentucky.17 The Court not only
noted the potentially compelling effect of commenting at trial on a de
fendant's silence, but also observed that, even in the absence of any
prosecutorial or judicial comment, a jury might draw inferences ad
verse to the defendant "if left to roam at large with only its untutored
instincts to guide it."18 As a result, the Court held, the trial judge "has
an affirmative obligation" to warn the jury not to draw an adverse in
ference from the defendant's silence.19 The judge's obligation to take
affirmative steps to dispel potentially compelling pressures applies
whenever the defendant requests such an instruction, regardless of any
other trial circumstances.
A threat to discharge a public employee for a refusal to testify
likewise is impermissibly compelling per se.20 The actual force of such
a threat for any given employee depends on the context - his assets,
the time remaining until retirement, any vested pension rights, his em
ployment opportunities in the private sector, and so on. Yet the Court
has never suggested that the totality of the circumstances must be as
sessed to determine if such a threat is compelling in light of the par
ticular employee's economic situation; the specific circumstances are
irrelevant.21
The same principle applies to a threat to disqualify a contractor
from doing business with public agencies because of his refusal to tes
tify. A host of economic factors affects the impact of such a threat on
any particular contractor. But under settled Fifth Amendment doc
trine, such contextual factors are irrelevant. The disqualification
threat, like the threat to discharge the public employee, is impermissi
bly compelling per se.22 And there is no longer anything the least bit
controversial about these holdings. None of the Justices has ever
thought to brand them as overbroad prophylactic rules or illegitimate
usurpations of legislative prerogative.
In short, totality-of-circumstances analysis, so often touted as the
only really pure and correct way to make Fifth Amendment judg16. Brooks
(1965).

v.

Tennessee. 406 U. S. 605 (1972); Griffin

v.

California, 380 U. S. 609, 614

17. 450 U. S. 288 (1981).
18.

Id.

at 301.

19.

Id.

at 303.

20. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 801 (1977).
21.

Id.

at 806.

22. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973). The Court's refusal to consider circumstan
tial distinctions in degrees of pressure is made explicit in an extended discussion, 414 U.S. at
.
83-84.
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ments,23 is entirely foreign to the Court's Fifth Amendment jurispru
dence, at least in settings other than the police station.
B.

The Origins of Exceptionalism

The story of how the Court came to define compulsion differently
in the police interrogation setting (what I have called Fifth
Amendment exceptionalism) is revealing. Before Miranda, Fifth
Amendment standards did not apply to police interrogation at all. In
deed, during the good old 1950s and early 1960s, Fifth Amendment re
strictions did not apply to any state proceedings whatsoever. The
Federal Constitution barred use of confessions in a state case only
when they were obtained by methods that in the totality of the circum
stances broke the defendant's will or shocked the judicial conscience.
Such confessions were deemed "involuntary."24
It was not until 1964, just two years prior to Miranda, that the
Court in Malloy v. Hogan25 took the revolutionary step of "incorpo
rating" the Fifth Amendment and applying it to the states. Even then,
the Fifth Amendment did not apply to police interrogation, federal or
state, because courts usually defined Fifth Amendment compulsion to
mean compulsion by formal process (by subpoena, for example),
rather than informal pressure, however severe.26 In effect, questioning
of suspects in police custody was subject to a different standard from
official questioning of suspects in any other setting; Fifth Amendment
exceptionalism was expressly encoded in legal doctrine prior to
Miranda. But before Malloy, the Court had little occasion to confront
the implications of this anomaly, because the Fifth Amendment was
not applicable to the states, and because in federal cases the supervi
sory rule suppressing statements obtained after an undue delay in ar
raignment27 avoided much of the need to assess issues of Fifth
Amendment compulsion.
Then, two years after Malloy, the Miranda Court took another
revolutionary step when it rejected the formal-process requirement
and held that Fifth Amendment barred any substantial pressure, for-

23. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2346-48 (2000) ( Scalia, J., dis
senting); Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U. S. 298, 306 (1985).
24. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936);

see

Catherine Hancock,

Due Process

Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195 (1996).
25. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
26. See Brown v. Mississippi: "[T)he right of the State to withdraw the privilege against
self-incrimination is not here involved. The compulsion to which the quoted statements
[concerning to the Fifth Amendment) refer is that of the processes of justice by which the
accused may be called as a witness and required to testify. Compulsion by torture to extort a
confession is a different matter." 297 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added).
27. Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957).
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mal or informal.28 The Court's opinion recounted in detail the history
of its interrogations cases and the jurisprudential divide that, until
then,
had
distinguished
its
standards
of
Fourteenth
Amendment "involuntariness" from its standards of Fifth Amendment
"compulsion." In rejecting the artificial notion that only formal legal
sanctions could count as "compelling," the Court ended Fifth
Amendment exceptionalism and applied the Fifth Amendment di
rectly to stationhouse interrogation. The Miranda Court made no ef
fort to hide the fact that these steps represented a radical, though justi
fied, break with the past. It ruled out stationhouse confessions
obtained by informal compulsion, even though (and the Court said
this explicitly) such confessions might not be involuntary in traditional
Fourteenth Amendment terms.29
I have mentioned two revolutionary steps, both of which involved
a radical break from then-existing precedent: the decision to apply the
Fifth Amendment to the states and the decision to include informal as
well as formal pressures within the concept of Fifth Amendment com
pulsion. Both steps now lie embedded in almost forty years of interro
gation and noninterrogation precedent, and no member of the Court,
Justices Scalia and Thomas included, shows any inclination to over
turn them.30
But, surprisingly, and with no fanfare, Fifth Amendment excep
tionalism has crept back into the picture. Without questioning the ap
plicability of the Fifth Amendment to the states and without chal
lenging the premise that informal stationhouse pressure is a form of
Fifth Amendment compulsion, the Court has managed to render these
once-controversial steps virtually meaningless. By subtle phraseology,
deployed originally by then-Justice Rehnquist and later followed by
Justice O'Connor, the Court silently up-ended the conceptual basis of
Miranda and once again rigidly compartmentalized its Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence. It began deciding police interrogation
cases as if they had nothing to do with Fifth Amendment precedents in
other settings. In the newly severed context of police interrogation,
now regarded as sui generis, the Court began speaking as if real com
pulsion (in that setting alone) required precisely what the Miranda
Court had held unnecessary, the stringent "breaking the will" brand of

28. "We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal
compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 461 (1966) (emphasis added).
29. "(W]e might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in tradi
tional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment
rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest." Miranda, 384 U. S. at 457.
30.

See

Schulhofer,

Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 15, at 439, 453 (1987).
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coercion that would render a confession involuntary in traditional
Fourteenth Amendment terms.31
We will probably never know whether Justice Rehnquist realized,
as he wrote Tucker, that he was draining Fifth Amendment compul
sion of its distinctive content, or whether verbal similarities between
compulsion and coercion by "breaking the will" simply obscured for
him the traditional distinction between Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment requirements. Either way, Tucker and subsequent cases
echoing its language accomplished a world-class conceptual counter
revolution.
Miranda had brought Fifth Amendment standards into the sta
tionhouse under the expressly stated assumption that those standards
provided more protection than the traditional Fourteenth
Amendment voluntariness requirement. Fifth Amendment require
ments do "sweep more broadly" than those of the Fourteenth, and it
was precisely for that reason that incorporation was, in its day, so con
troversial. Starting with Tucker, the Court took the teeth out of incor
poration by asserting that compulsion meant nothing different from
involuntariness after all. If valid, that claim leaves one to wonder what
all the fuss was about in Malloy v. Hogan and why Justices Harlan and
Clark so passionately argued, in dissent, that only Fourteenth
Amendment voluntariness, not freedom from Fifth Amendment com
pulsion, should be required of the states.
Tucker, however, dealt only with police interrogation and stopped
short of equating compulsion with involuntariness across the board. Its
author was perhaps content to plant seeds that could ultimately un
dermine not only Miranda but the protective Fifth Amendment juris
prudence applicable in non-stationhouse settings as well. However
that may be, the net effect of the Tucker-Elstad-Quarles language was
to bring the law full circle, reinstituting Fifth Amendment exception
alism, and - for the stationhouse setting only - assuming that a con
fession could be truly compelled only if it was judged involuntary un
der the totality of the circumstances.
That historical and conceptual background is crucial for assessing
the legitimacy of the Miranda restrictions and the importance of as
suring that they are respected in practice. When police interrogate a
suspect who is alone, in custody, and unable to walk away from ques
tions he wants to avoid; when police do not warn him that he isn't re
quired to answer; when they do not warn him that he has the right to
31. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 312, 315 (1985) ("[A) simple failure to adminis
ter the warnings [is not equivalent to) actual coercion . . [There) is a vast difference between
coercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break
the suspect's will and . . . [a) disclosure freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoer
cive question . . . [R)espondent's earlier remark was voluntary, within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment." (emphasis added)). Note especially the last quoted sentence, giving the
word "voluntary" textual status, as if it were part of the language of the Fifth Amendment.
.
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cut off the questioning, return to his cell, and sleep or rest if he wishes;
when they do not honor his pleas to be left alone and instead continue
to press on him their questions, their seductive offers of help, and their
alarming comments on the evidence against him, the pressures dwarf
those faced by the public employee, the public contractor, or even
many witnesses who (with the help of counsel) face a citation for con
tempt.32
Judged by the standards that govern Fifth Amendment assess
ments in every other context, a police interrogation without warnings
and without any right to escape unwanted questions is unambiguously
compelling. And it is compelling per se, regardless of the suspect's age,
intelligence, education, or economic circumstances, regardless of
whether guns or billy clubs are waved in his face, and regardless of
how long the questioning ultimately lasts.33 Absent safeguards as
strong or stronger than those mandated by Miranda, such an interro
gation, from the very outset, violates the Fifth Amendment - the real
Fifth Amendment - and not just some set of broader, optional pro
phylactic rules.

32. The comparison suggested in the text perhaps oversimplifies in assuming a unitary
metric to assess degrees of compulsion presented by qualitatively different forms of pres
sure. Formal penalties are, in one sense, especially troublesome because they exact an ex
plicit, officially sanctioned price for conduct that the Constitution expressly protects. And
formal penalties can be prohibited without inviting the kind of line-drawing problems that
inevitably attend attempts to prescribe informal pressures. From that perspective, one could
conceivably argue that Fifth Amendment compulsion should be understood to embrace only
formal sanctions, together with the extreme types of informal pressure that rise to the level
of Fourteenth Amendment involuntariness.
That approach, however, seems unsatisfactory as a matter of both substance and prece
dent. Any effort to limit informal compulsion to sanctions that overbear the will would stand
in tension with the case law applicable to informal economic pressure, most notably
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977). Moreover, formal penalties are imposed
openly, subject to specific limits and with time for a rational weighing of alternatives with the
advice of counsel.From that perspective, the psychologically coercive effect of formal penal
ties and their capacity to engender fear seem far less significant than is the case for many
informal pressures, especially those deployed by police in the unregulated incommunicado
context of custodial police interrogation. That said, the precise content of informal "compul
sion" remains open to more specific elaboration.
33. It is technically an overstatement to suggest that compulsion must inevitably be pre
sent in every conceivable interrogation. Imagine that a knowledgeable suspect, fully aware
of his right to silence and fully briefed by his attorney, is questioned without full Miranda
warnings, after being assured that the arresting officer has only one short question to ask and
will then leave the suspect alone in his cell. If the suspect then confesses, it would be implau
sible to suggest that his response was the result of "compulsion." Cases of this sort, however,
are surely rare, if not nonexistent.In virtually all real cases of custodial interrogation without
warnings, the circumstantial pressures, from the very outset, are at least as significant as
those found "compelling" in cases like Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), Cunningham,
431 U.S. 801 (1977), and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70 (1973). For a discussion of the jus
tification for per se rules in settings where a few cases might, if scrutinized, be found to lack
the facts that are determinative in principle, see Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra
note 15.
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NEXT STEPS- SUBSTITUTES FOR MIRANDA

The conception of the Fifth Amendment I advance here may strike
some as utopian. It is certainly not the criterion by which reform ef
forts will be judged by the current Court or by any Court we are likely
to get. So I will put myself in the shoes of Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Rehnquist and consider which possible reform alterna
tives are likely to satisfy the more grudging conception of the Fifth
Amendment that holds sway on the Court today. The controlling cri
terion is that any alternative must include "procedures that will warn a
suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure
the suspect that his exercise of that right will be honored."34
One much-discussed alternative to Miranda is the option of video
taping the confession or the entire interrogation. Videotaping only the
confession is useful only to the police; it provides others no window
into the "suction process"35 by which the confession was elicited. So
videotaping only the confession cannot possibly serve as a replace
ment for any part of Miranda. I don't think anyone seriously suggests
that it could.
Videotaping the entire interrogation process is an alternative that
some, Professor Cassell most prominently, suggest as a replacement
for Miranda.36 Videotaping mitigates the problem of the swearing con
test - it gives us a more or less clear picture of what occurred. But the
swearing contest was not a problem that Miranda sought to solve, and
videotaping does nothing to address the problems that Miranda did
seek to address.
Recall that the swearing contest problem was pressed on the Court
in the Miranda arguments, but the Court chose to ignore it. On the he
roic assumption that the normal fact-finding process will accurately re
solve credibility questions, Miranda sought measures to dispel the in
herently compelling effect of custodial interrogation. A videotape will
not do that if, as Professor Cassell hopes,37 we can keep suspects from
knowing about it. If suspects do not know that what police do to them
in the interrogation room is being recorded for outside observers, the
psychological atmosphere they confront will be exactly the same as the
one the Miranda Court correctly pronounced inherently compelling.
Even if suspects learn or are told explicitly that what happens to
them in the privacy of the interrogation room is being taped, the pres34. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 (2000). The limitation, as originally
stated in Miranda, is virtually identical: Any alternative must be "at least as effective in ap
prising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it .... " 384 U.S. at 467.
35.

See Watts v. lndiana, 338 U. S. 49, 53 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

36. Cassell,
37.

Id.

supra note 2, at 492.

at 492 & n.610.
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sures that Miranda sought to dissipate will nonetheless remain un
checked. Any suspect who is worried about outright torture will find
little reassurance in a tape that a lawless officer can turn off or destroy
at will. The more subtle pressures remain unchanged and may even be
enhanced if the suspect worries about how he will appear on tape as
he persists in refusing to answer. A videotape unaccompanied by the
existing Miranda system will make matters much worse, not better.
There is no reason, moreover, to think that the Court's centrists
would disagree. For the current Court, any valid alternative to
Miranda must include "procedures that will warn a suspect in custody
of his right to remain silent and which will assure the suspect that his
exercise of that right will be honored."38 Videotaping the interroga
tion, with or without the suspect's knowledge, does nothing to inform
him of his right to remain silent, and it does nothing to assure him that
his exercise of that right will be honored. Indeed, the aim of the video
taping proposal is to eliminate Miranda's cut-off right and free the po
lice to continue questioning the suspect who says he prefers not to
talk.39 So as an alternative to Miranda, videotaping is a nonstarter.
There is, however, an intriguing possibility for audio or videotape
that the Court's test for alternatives brings to mind. Videotaping the
interrogation does nothing to warn the suspect, but why not videotape
or audiotape the warnings themselves? Any recent visitor to New
York has probably heard the recorded message that greets you when
you close the door of a taxicab. The voice of Mayor Giuliani, Barbra
Streisand, or Oprah implores you to "buckle up," makes sure you
know that using your seat belt is the cool thing to do. In interrogation,
of course, a major concern centers on the tone in which police deliver
the warnings; the worry is that police often manage to convey that no
innocent person would sensibly seek to hide behind Miranda. So why
do we leave the warnings up to the very people most likely to blunt
their effect?
A better approach would be a system in which, when the suspect
gets into the back seat of the squad car, as soon as the door closes, he
would hear the voice of Johnnie Cochran, Alan Dershowitz, or Yale
Kamisar telling him his rights in no uncertain terms (or even imploring
him to "buckle up"). That is a genuine alternative to the warnings
branch of Miranda. Earlier versions of the same idea involved proce
dures to have a magistrate or duty counsel at the stationhouse inform
a suspect of his rights before interrogation could begin.
Procedures of this sort would do almost everything that police
delivered warnings can do, and they would avoid disputes about
whether police delivered the warnings too late or got the details
38. Dickerson, 120

S. Ct. at

2335.

39. See Cassell, supra note 2, at 492.
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wrong. So these are promising alternatives to the warnings require
ment of Miranda, and there is little doubt that the Court would uphold
them as substitutes for police-delivered warnings.40
Taking the same idea one step further, some suggested during the
Dickerson debates that Miranda warnings had become superfluous. By
now, they said, suspects no longer need warnings from the police,
much less from Professor Kamisar. Thanks to movies and TV, they al
ready know that they have the right to remain silent, and therefore,
some said, it was really irrelevant whether Miranda was overruled.41
The Court did not buy that argument for several pretty obvious
reasons. Television scripts can change even faster than Supreme Court
precedent. If warnings were no longer required, many police would
stop giving them, and then the television shows might stop depicting
them. Before long, suspects wouldn't know they had the right to re
main silent. At that point, the Supreme Court would have to overrule
the overruling and re-instate Miranda, at least for three or four televi
sion seasons, when the cycle would start all over again.
And that quirk is the least of the problems. The more basic points
are two: First, a civics lesson, even one dramatized on a cop show, is
no substitute for a warning from official sources at the moment of ar
rest. Any arrestee, even a constitutional scholar, needs the assurance
that his rights are acknowledged and accepted by those who hold him
in their power.
Second, the claim that now we all know our Miranda rights (be
cause we've heard the warnings so often)42 refutes itself. The public's
tendency to identify Miranda with the warnings requirement shows
that, even now, after three decades, the public does not know its
Miranda rights. The public, and many law students, still do not under
stand the heart of Miranda, which lies not so much in the famous
warnings as in the cut-off rule - that if at any time the suspect indi
cates a desire to remain silent, all questioning must cease.43 This rule,
far more than the warnings, revolutionized police interrogation and
posed the greatest potential threat to the confession rate. We will al
ways need a system to inform suspects of their rights at the time of ar
rest, but an effective system of warnings can serve only as a substitute
for police-delivered warnings, not for the other elements of the
Miranda system.

40. We might worry, however, that without police acknowledgment of the warnings, a
suspect who knows perfectly well the rights that the law gives him would nonetheless have
no assurance that the police were prepared to honor those rights.
41.

E.g.,

Akhil Reed Amar,

Ok, All Together Now: 'You Have the Right to .

TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, at Ml.
42. Amar, supra note 41.
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).

.

. ' L.A.
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We could conceivably eliminate Miranda requirements altogether
(the warnings, the express-waiver requirement and the suspect's right
to cut off questioning at any time) if we required interrogation, like
post-indictment line-ups, to be conducted only in the presence of
counsel.44 Or we could prohibit all interrogation by police and permit
questioning of an arrestee only when conducted by a magistrate in
open court in the presence of defense counsel. Again, there is little
doubt that the Court would uphold substitutes like these.
But none of these proposals is very attractive to the political con
stituencies that complain so insistently that "law enforcement never
recovered from the blow inflicted by Miranda."45 Even the modest
idea of replacing police-delivered warnings with Kamisar-delivered
warnings is politically unacceptable for the same reason that it is not
constitutionally unacceptable - it would be at least as protective of
the suspect (and therefore at least as burdensome to investigators) as
Miranda itself.
The converse is also true. To attract political support, any substi
tute for Miranda must to some extent dilute the protections that sus
pects now get under Miranda. So politically attractive alternatives to
Miranda cannot pass constitutional muster, and constitutional alterna
tives cannot attract political support - unless the alternative's sup
porters can spin their case well enough to dupe either the judicial or
political audience, in one direction or the other. That's the real reason
that no legislature has attempted to develop a serious replacement for
the Miranda system.
III.

SUPPLEMENTS

FOR MIRANDA

Dickerson leaves us with only one question of practical signifi
cance. The Miranda rules will remain as the constitutionally mandated
floor, but there is ample room for steps to supplement the Miranda
system.
One attractive option would be to mandate videotaping in addition
to the substantive ground rules laid down by Miranda. Videotaping
would greatly reduce the problems of the swearing contest and, except
for expenses (which generally appear to be minimal), videotaping in
fringes no conceivable governmental interest. Everyone gains by
having an unambiguous record of what actually occurred in the inter
rogation.46
There are a large number of other procedural possibilities changes in the rules governing use of confessions for impeachment,
44. United States

45.

Cassell,

v.

Wade, 388 U.S.218

(1967).

All Benefits, No Costs, supra note 4, at 1090-91.

46. For more
4, at 556-57.

detailed discussion, see Schulhofer, Miranda's

Practical Effect, supra note
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use of fruits, controls over deceptive interrogation methods, and safe
guards against false confessions. All of these options pose similar
problems of trying to honor constitutional rights, to maintain or en
hance protections for the suspect (especially the innocent suspect),
and simultaneously to maintain or enhance public safety by ade
quately preventing violent crime. That dilemma is the constant preoc
cupation of students of criminal procedure, and it will continue to de
serve careful attention.
Nonetheless, efforts to resolve that dilemma offer only limited op
portunities for improvement. If we implement a system of stronger
warnings, narrow some of the exceptions to Miranda, or grant defen
dants a less onerous burden of proof, we set in motion a familiar de
bate. Constitutional rights are better protected (at least a bit, at the
margins), but crime control will suffer (at least a bit, at the margins).
The implications can be projected with infinite imagination and re
finement. But at the end of the day, the effects at issue are exceedingly
small, on both the civil liberties and crime control sides of the equa
tion.
We can perhaps make progress if we are willing to step outside the
narrow boundaries of the usual procedural reform debate. If our goal
is (as it should be) the effective protection of the innocent and decent
treatment of the guilty, we can accomplish infinitely more through
structural reform of police departments and better delivery of defense
services than we can ever hope to achieve by a dozen changes in im
peachment doctrine or shifts in various burdens of proof.47 And gains
from the first set of strategies should come with no adverse effect (and
probably some beneficial effect) on our crime-control effort.
There are similar win-win opportunities if we focus attention on
proven strategies that make large dents in the crime rate without di
minishing civil liberties. If our goal is (as it should be) the reduction of
violent crime and effective protection of the most vulnerable members
of society, we should be thinking about prenatal care in risky
pregnancies, better health services for pre-school children, scattered
site housing, Head Start and other education initiatives, better funding
for battered women's shelters and intervention for abusive men, drug
treatment on demand, and even hiring more police officers. For all of
these strategies (with the possible exception of hiring more officers)
there are now solid, uncontroversial data showing very large, cost
effective crime-control gains.48 Again, we can accomplish infinitely
47. Cf William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 65-74 (1997) (discussing importance of funding decisions
and substantive culpability requirements).
48. See NAT'L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT
DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING (1998); LISBETH 8. SCHORR, WITHIN OUR REACH (1988);
John J. Donohue III & Peter Seligman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social
Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1998).
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more through steps of this sort than we can ever hope to achieve by
weakening Miranda, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and all
the rest of the Warren Court edifice combined. And we can achieve
those gains without putting any of our Bill of Rights safeguards at risk.
So if crime control is on our minds, we cannot look at the details of
criminal procedure in isolation. We have to consider the entire range
of promising crime-reduction strategies. And we have to think care
fully about which research projects or programmatic efforts should
have the first claim on our limited time and energies.49
Above all, we have to remember, as much on the crime-control
side as on the civil-liberties side, that resources are crucial. In the mid1950's, before the Warren Court started "handcuffing the police," we
had 121 police officers for every 100 violent crimes. By the 1990s that
number had fallen to only 28 police officers for every 100 violent
crimes.50 Whatever difficulties police may encounter because of new
criminal procedure requirements pale in comparison to the burden we
inflict on them when we leave each officer with, in effect, more than
four times as many violent crimes to handle.
It is in this light that I want to do what must be very bad form in a
criminal procedure symposium, and that is to insist that we stop our
obsessive focus on the technical nuances of criminal procedure. Courts
still have to decide cases, and criminal procedure scholars still have to
help them where we can. But we should not overestimate the value of
the enterprise. Regardless of who is right or wrong about the implica
tions of doctrinal change, the debate itself diverts energy and atten
tion, our own and that of whatever public may be listening. This waste
of time and energy is the real tragedy of the Dickerson case and the
years of litigation and advocacy scholarship that law enforcement
proponents devoted to their quixotic effort to force a reconsideration
of Miranda. I hope that mistake will not be repeated in the years to
come.

49.

See

Stuntz, supra note 47, at 72-76.

50. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda,

supra note 4, at 372.

